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MAKING AMENDS: AMENDING THE ICSID
CONVENTION TO RECONCILE COMPETING
INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW
KATE M. SUPNIK†
ABSTRACT
Globalization has increased international investment activity, but
no unified legal framework governs international investments. After
several attempts to establish a multilateral investment framework,
prospective parties remain unable to reach a consensus on a viable
system to address investor and state rights. Developed, capitalexporting states wish to protect their citizens’ investments, whereas
developing states simultaneously seek to attract investments and
maintain regulatory autonomy.
In the absence of a comprehensive agreement, bilateral investment
treaties serve as the primary legal instruments setting forth the terms
of cross-border investments. These treaties often grant private
investors the right to file claims before the International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). ICSID cases sometimes
raise questions that mirror the competing interests of developed and
developing states that surface during multilateral investment treaty
negotiations.
Amending the ICSID Convention to include a provision allowing
tribunals to consider environmental, public health, and labor
concerns would serve as a positive step toward establishing an
investment regime that maximizes the interests of investors and host
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states alike. This scheme would better address state interests, enhance
ICSID’s legitimacy, and increase the likelihood of future, successful
negotiations to establish a workable and comprehensive multilateral
investment framework.

INTRODUCTION
Suppose a Spanish company invests in a hotel and resort
community in Egypt that will welcome foreign visitors and stimulate
the Egyptian economy by attracting international industry-specific
organizations for major conferences. The company satisfies all
government regulations and obtains the requisite permits. Relying on
the Egyptian government’s approval, the Spanish company invests
millions of dollars to construct a lavish property. Months after the
company opens the resort’s doors but prior to recouping its
investment, the Egyptian government enacts discriminatory
regulations that thwart the hotel’s business objectives. The measures
require foreign-owned hotel properties to refrain from hosting
conferences and to pay a 25 percent assessment on all revenues to
fund domestic research projects. The regulations appreciably upset
the Spanish company’s expectations by cutting away from anticipated
profits while providing a distinct advantage to Egyptian competitors
that are not subject to the measures. Historically, the Spanish
company would have had little choice but to turn to Egypt’s domestic
courts to seek damages on an expropriation claim. Egyptian courts
would likely favor its government’s measures over the Spanish
company’s interests.
International investment law, however, provides alternative
recourse through binding arbitration, even without a contractual
arbitration provision. Under Spain and Egypt’s bilateral investment
treaty (BIT), private investors from one state may bring claims
against the other state through the International Centre for the
1
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). BITs provide ground
rules for protecting foreign investment, and commentators contend
2
they facilitate international commercial transactions. ICSID
arbitration protects cross-border investment by hearing disputes over

1. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Egypt-Spain,
art. 11, ¶ 2, Nov. 3, 1992, 1820 U.N.T.S. 194.
2. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 12
(1995).
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agreements among sovereign states, including BITs and regional
trade agreements that address foreign investment. These
international agreements are at the heart of a number of the 122
3
disputes pending before ICSID. Some commentators have criticized
4
these agreements for being one-sided. Unequal bargaining power
often translates into a developing country’s acceptance of
5
international investment agreements on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In
agreeing to unfavorable BIT terms, a developing state often limits its
ability to enact regulatory measures contrary to the interests of
private parties in developed states.
When capital-importing states enact measures to enhance
environmental or social conditions within their borders, governments
may find themselves subject to expropriation claims by foreign
investors. Although investment protection carries the benefit of
promoting capital flows and funding poor countries, private investors
may perceive potential windfalls within strong protection provisions
and bring claims against states for enacting legitimate regulations that
promote sustainable development consistent with international
treaties. The possibility of facing costly lawsuits may discourage
developing countries from enacting measures to promote
environmental and social initiatives. This possibility may also render
states hostile toward ICSID jurisdiction or participation in an
international investment law regime.
Attempts to create a comprehensive international investment
treaty have failed due in large part to a historic discrepancy between
6
the interests of developed and developing states. New proposals for a

3. International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, List of Pending Cases,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=List
Pending (last visited Sept. 28, 2009). See generally LUCY REED, JAN PAULSSON & NIGEL
BLACKABY, GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION (2004) (providing a procedural overview of ICSID
arbitration).
4. E.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles of
Cross-Border Legal Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights with Responsibilities,
23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 451, 468 (2008).
5. See, e.g., Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital:
The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 277 (“Host
countries, on the other hand, realize that they must compete with other potential hosts, and
therefore cannot demand changes to the core provisions of the treaties.”).
6. See, e.g., Peter Muchlinski, Policy Issues, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 3, 14 (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph
Schreuer eds., 2008) (addressing the need for a balance “between the legitimate interests of
investors to enjoy their investments in a settled, transparent, and predictable investment policy
environment and the legitimate interests of the host country to pursue its development goals”).
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comprehensive multilateral investment agreement would likely
7
succumb to the same shortcomings that thwarted previous efforts.
Alternative methods of enhancing international investment’s legal
framework could provide a much needed push toward reconciling
8
competing interests. Incremental changes to the current international
investment system incorporating compromise measures would
provide a forum to test innovations in investment law. It would also
pave the way for a successful multilateral agreement that accounts for
the competing interests of developed and developing countries.
The international trade regime, which, unlike investment law,
has an institutional backbone through the World Trade Organization
(WTO), accommodates some state regulatory activity through a series
of General Exceptions included in the General Agreement on Tariffs
9
and Trade (GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services
10
(GATS), and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
11
Measures (TRIMs). In spite of the potential for protectionist market
12
effects that run contrary to the WTO’s free trade goals, the General
Exceptions recognize state regulatory autonomy in areas including
13
public health and the environment. By providing a safe harbor for
certain regulatory activities, these provisions have the potential to
encourage developing states to adopt policies for sustainable
development and social growth.
This Note argues that amending the ICSID Convention to
include a provision allowing arbitral tribunals to consider
environmental, public health, and labor concerns would constitute a
positive step toward developing an investment regime that maximizes
the interests of investors and host states alike. A provision that

7. See infra Part II.
8. See generally Muchlinski, supra note 6, at 10–15 (describing ideological controversies in
international investment law).
9. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
10. General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1167.
11. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/18-trims.pdf.
12. See generally PETER GALLAGHER, THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF THE WTO: 1995–2005
(2005) (describing WTO activities during its first decade in operation); AUTAR KRISHEN KOUL,
GUIDE TO THE WTO AND GATT: ECONOMICS, LAW, AND POLITICS (2005) (providing a
historical overview and analysis of the international trade system).
13. Salman Bal, International Free Trade Agreements and Human Rights: Reinterpreting
Article XX of the GATT, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 62, 69 (2001).
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enables and encourages ICSID arbitrators to evaluate investor-state
disputes similar to the General Exceptions set forth in the World
Trade Organization regime would more adequately address state
interests, enhance ICSID’s legitimacy, and lead to a workable and
comprehensive multilateral investment framework.
Part I presents background on international investment law.
First, it examines the competing interests that have blocked previous
attempts to establish a comprehensive, multilateral investment treaty.
Second, it addresses the novelty of investor-state disputes before
ICSID and demonstrates why it may be an appropriate forum
through which to take alternative measures to ultimately enable a
multilateral investment framework. Part II analyzes the failures of
previous attempts to create a multilateral investment treaty and
suggests how these failures should guide future negotiations. Part III
introduces trade law exemptions, which provide a logical source for a
provision that seeks to balance interests between states and private
parties in the investment regime. Finally, Part IV explores the
potential effectiveness of an ICSID amendment to advance
international investment law, looking to changes in the international
investment paradigm as well as the implications of using investment
treaties grounded in anachronistic assumptions.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT SYSTEM
AND INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES
In the absence of a comprehensive international investment
framework, BITs commonly set forth the terms of cross-border
investment activity. The rights and obligations that arise from these
treaties attain their authority through enforcement mechanisms,
14
including international arbitration. In the international investment
context, ICSID arbitration provides investors with a right of action
15
that compels compliance with the terms of BITs. A significant
amount of international investment law may be characterized through
16
the rise of both BITs and investor-state disputes.

14. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 2, at 120–21.
15. Joachim Delaney & Daniel Barstow Magraw, Procedural Transparency, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 6, at 721, 726.
16. See CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 26 (2007) (“BITs
became viewed as a preferred type of international instrument to regulate the bilateral
treatment of foreign investments.”).
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To fully grasp the need for reform in international investment
law, some background on BITs, investor-state arbitration, and their
interplay is necessary. Part I.A introduces BITs and Part I.B traces
the development of ICSID arbitration. Part I.C introduces potential
challenges to ICSID’s legitimacy, which may be skirted with the
implementation of an amendment that addresses the interests of
capital-importing states.
A. BITs: The De Facto Building Blocks of International Investment
Law
States enter into BITs to promote economic cooperation and
encourage international investment flows that “stimulate . . .
17
economic development.” BITs set forth the terms by which host
states treat international investment and provide dispute resolution
18
provisions for potential breaches. A capital-exporting state enters
into a BIT to protect its citizens’ and corporations’ investments in a
particular country, whereas capital importers provide “an economic
19
20
bill of rights” to encourage that investment. A capital exporter
negotiates for limits on a host state’s regulatory autonomy, because it
21
represents investors who wish to minimize expenditures.

17. E.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Government of [Country]
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Feb. 5, 2004,
available at http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id_article=137 (follow “US draft model BIT”
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 16, 2009) [hereinafter 2004 U.S. Model BIT]; Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Government of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Uru., Nov. 4,
2005, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 109-9 (2006) [hereinafter U.S.-Uruguay BIT]. For a general overview
of BITs and international investment disputes, see generally DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 2.
18. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 469, 470 (2000).
19. Susan D. Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92
MINN. L. REV. 161, 172 (2007).
20. Id. Common protections within BITs include
guarantees of appropriate compensation for expropriation, promises of freedom from
unreasonable or discriminatory measures, guarantees of national treatment for the
investment, assurances of fair and equitable treatment, promises that investments will
receive full protection and security, undertakings that a sovereign will honor its
obligations, and assurances that foreign direct investment . . . will receive treatment
no less favorable than that accorded under international law.
Id.
21. See Victor Mosoti, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Possibility of a Multilateral
Framework on Investment at the WTO: Are Poor Economies Caught in Between?, 26 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 95, 98–99 (2005) (“[F]oreign investors do not want their transaction costs to be
increased by seemingly burdensome requirements beyond the evaluation and entry process.”).
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Developing countries largely perceive foreign direct investment
22
(FDI) as a necessity for economic growth. In fact, developing states
often enact regulations for the very purpose of attracting foreign
23
investment. Competition to attract available capital exists among
similarly situated developing states, thereby inducing them to grant
concessions when negotiating BITs with capital-exporting states as
24
well as individual contracts with private investors. Free trade
agreements containing investment provisions operate in a similar
manner, as do regional trade provisions, notably the investment
provisions prescribed in Chapter 11 of the North American Free
25
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Developing countries have historically objected to the principles
embodied within BITs and other international investment
26
agreements. This is especially true of Latin American countries that
subscribed to the Calvo Doctrine’s assertions of sovereignty for much
27
of the twentieth century. The Calvo Doctrine posits that foreign
investors are subject to a host government’s legal system and are not
entitled to enhanced treatment, including external fora for resolving
28
disputes. By the 1970s, however, developing states felt it necessary
to attract foreign investment and many proceeded to enter into
29
BITs, despite their provisions for international dispute resolution.

22. Id. at 97.
23. Id. at 101.
24. See id. at 125–26 (“Developing countries have also been willing to sign on to BITs
providing for compensation because BITs offer an opportunity to negotiate and offer
concessions to a potential investor in competition to and, hopefully, at the exclusion of, other
potential hosts.”).
25. Several ICSID claims arise from NAFTA and free trade agreements, and BITs bear
overwhelming similarity to these instruments. In principle, BITs, regional trade agreements, and
free trade agreements may be discussed in tandem; however, this Note primarily focuses on
BITs. On a broader scale, the international investment system may be described as a “dense and
diverse web of overlapping instruments, including bilateral (BITs), regional, sectoral, and
multilateral instruments, and non-binding initiatives which differ considerably in legal
characteristics, scope, and subject-matter.” Friedl Weiss, Trade and Investment, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 6, at 182, 186.
26. Vandevelde, supra note 18, at 470.
27. Former Argentine foreign minister Carlos Calvo first articulated the doctrine, and
several Latin American countries incorporated the doctrine into their constitutions. Christopher
M. Ryan, Meeting Expectations: Assessing the Long-Term Legitimacy and Stability of
International Investment Law, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 725, 728 (2008). For further discussion of the
Calvo Doctrine, see CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 16–19
(2008).
28. Ryan, supra note 27, at 728.
29. Id. at 730.
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Some commentators have suggested that “international legal
sovereignty” is so important in the contemporary global economy
that “any adverse impacts on Westphalian sovereignty are more than
offset by the benefits that derive from [participation in the
30
international investment] regime.”
31
By 2008, more than 2,500 BITs had entered into force. The
agreements almost uniformly include provisions on the scope of
32
33
investment, standards of treatment for investment, the scope of
34
35
expropriation, and dispute settlement procedures. BITs are
36
generally entered into on a take-it-or-leave-it basis according to
37
drafts offered by developed countries. The one-sided nature of BIT
negotiations favoring developed states can explain treaty
38
standardization.
The manner in which developing countries seek to enter into
BITs suggests that developing countries find the agreements essential
to their economic well-being. Signing BITs “may help legitimize a
developing country in the international arena and, thus, attract
39
increased levels of foreign direct investment.” There is no definitive
proof, however, that the existence of a BIT increases investment
40
flows. The existence of a BIT may simply be one among many
factors influencing an investment decision, including financial risks,
41
market stability, human capital, and existing relationships. Professor
Jürgen Kurtz has argued that a BIT may simply act as a mechanism of
wealth transfer because investors do not consider the existence of a

30. Chris Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions
Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 141, 144 (2002).
31. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 17 (2008).
32. E.g., U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 17, at art. 2.
33. E.g., id. art. 5.
34. E.g., id. art. 6.
35. E.g., id. § B.
36. Elkins et al., supra note 5, at 276.
37. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 170 (2005).
38. See Elkins et al., supra note 5, at 277 (“This uniformity suggests that host countries are
price takers with respect to the terms of these treaties . . . .”).
39. Ryan, supra note 28, at 737.
40. Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the
Rule of Law, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 337, 339 (2007).
41. See id. (listing “critical variables” that factor into investment decisions).
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42

BIT when making investment decisions. Procedural rights granted in
dispute settlement provisions, however, are among the most attractive
aspects of BITs; these provisions regularly provide private investors
43
with a right of action outside a host state’s legal system.
B. ICSID and Investor-State Arbitration
Nearly all BITs provide investors with a private right of action
through ICSID arbitration, in accordance with arbitral rules
established by the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL), or through the International Chamber of
44
Commerce Court of Arbitration. ICSID’s caseload surged as states
entered into BITs, which represent the most common basis for
45
investment arbitration.
ICSID, a branch of the World Bank, was established by the 1965
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) to provide an
alternative international forum for disputes that arise in the course of
46
international commerce. Unlike the World Trade Organization
Dispute Settlement Body and other international dispute resolution
institutions, ICSID does not require aggrieved investors to petition
47
their home states to bring a claim against a host state. ICSID also
provides an alternative to filing a suit in a host state’s domestic legal
system, which may lack the sophisticated legal protections with which
an investor may be familiar. Even in states with legitimate legal

42. Jürgen Kurtz, A General Investment Agreement in the WTO? Lessons from Chapter 11
of NAFTA and the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L.
713, 730 (2002).
43. See Franck, supra note 19, at 172–73 (“Rather than creating unenforceable substantive
rights or forcing investors to rely on home governments to resolve disputes on their behalf,
[investment] treaties provide a forum to redress alleged wrongs.”).
44. Stefan D. Amarasinha & Juliane Kokott, Multilateral Investment Rules Revisited, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 6, at 119, 148–50.
45. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 31, at 242.
46. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Preamble, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (addressing “the need for
international cooperation and economic development”).
47. The advent of an investor-state dispute system can depoliticize a claim, particularly
when home states may be reluctant to pursue a claim against a host state for reasons of
diplomacy. See, e.g., Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of
ICSID to the Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 345, 358 (2007) (noting that investor-state
arbitration “provides an avenue for transferring disputes from political sphere to legal”).
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systems, investors may justifiably fear a home-state bias. Investors
also value the structural flexibility that parties retain during an ICSID
49
arbitration. This very provision provides investors with a sense of
protection that likely factors into a corporation’s investment
50
decisions. More than 140 states are parties to the ICSID Convention.
Consent to arbitration occurs when a sovereign state signs an
investment treaty that allows investors from another state to submit
51
claims against it. Three arbitrators, one appointed by each party to a
dispute and one appointed by the two initial arbitrators, comprise a
52
typical ICSID tribunal arising from BITs. Arbitrators are generally
familiar with investment disputes or a specialized area relevant to the
53
dispute. ICSID tribunals apply previously stipulated governing law,
and in the event that parties have not previously reached such an
agreement, a tribunal will apply the host state’s domestic laws and
54
rules of international law. Arbitral proceedings are, at least in part,
55
made available publicly. They are popular among investors because
56
arbitral awards are widely enforceable.

48. Franck, supra note 40, at 365. ICSID arbitration distances investor-state disputes from
political concerns. See W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in
ICSID Arbitration, 1989 DUKE L.J. 739, 751 (“[ICSID] also sought to reduce the role of national
courts in enforcement even more than in other available systems of private international
arbitration by providing for direct enforcement with no possibility of challenging an award in
national courts in which enforcement otherwise would have been sought.”).
49. Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time for a Legal Assistance Center for
Developing Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 248–49
(2007).
50. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, List of Contracting States
and Other Signatories of the Convention, ICSID/3 (Nov. 4, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org
(follow “List of Contracting States” hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
51. In addition to consent through bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, consent
may arise through a direct agreement between a sovereign state and a private investor or
through national legislation on investment. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 31, at 238.
52. REED ET AL., supra note 3, at 78.
53. David R. Sedlak, Comment, ICSID’s Resurgence in International Investment
Arbitration: Can the Momentum Hold?, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 147, 152 (2004).
54. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, supra note 46, art. 42(1). In an ICSID arbitration, domestic rules are tested against
international legal principles. In the event of an international law violation, a domestic law may
not be applied in an award. Odumosu, supra note 47, at 368.
55. Odumosu, supra note 47, at 361.
56. See DUGAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 182 (“This widespread compliance with
arbitration awards is due in large part to the effectiveness of the New York and ICSID
Conventions’ enforcement provisions, which ensure that in most circumstances a losing
respondent will be unable to avoid execution on assets in scores of national court
jurisdictions.”). The New York Convention requires states to enforce arbitral awards under
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Independent of BITs, customary international law allows states
to regulate foreign investment within their borders as a function of
58
sovereignty. Under this principle, states maintain the right to make
decisions regarding permissible foreign investment within their
59
borders and establish related controls. But customary international
law, despite these benefits, has been considered insufficient to
60
vindicate the rights of foreign investors, whose interests are unlikely
61
to align with capital-importing states’ agendas. ICSID is in many
respects a solution to cure perceived deficiencies in customary
international law as private investors become more prevalent in the
62
international arena. By allowing individuals to bring claims against
foreign governments, ICSID reflects international law’s shift toward
63
recognizing individuals as subjects.
ICSID’s novelty rests in the power it grants private investors
64
wishing to bring suits against sovereign states; ICSID arbitration,
65
however, was not commonly used during its first two decades. As
states enter into an increasing number of BITs, investors have seized
the opportunity to bring claims involving billions of dollars and
most circumstances, id. at 88, and “creates an automatic priority for arbitration over national
court litigation,” MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 16, at 83.
57. One definition characterizes customary international law as a source of law that
“results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1987). State practice “includes diplomatic acts and instructions as well as
public measures and other governmental acts and official statements of policy.” Id. § 102 cmt. B.
For a discussion of customary international law, see generally LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 59–108 (4th ed. 2001).
58. Mosoti, supra note 21, at 100.
59. Id.
60. James D. Fry, International Human Rights Law in Investment Arbitration: Evidence of
International Law’s Unity, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 77, 114 (2007).
61. See infra Part I.A.
62. See Gabriel Egli, Comment, Don’t Get Bit: Addressing ICSID’s Inconsistent
Application of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses to Dispute Resolution Provisions, 34 PEPP. L. REV.
1045, 1064 (2007) (“The lack of customary international law governing the treatment of
international investments makes the current BIT regime essential to the protection of
international investors and investments.”).
63. Christopher J. Borgen, Transnational Tribunals and the Transmission of Norms: The
Hegemony of Process, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 685, 686 (2007) (“This shift from interState dispute resolution to transnational dispute resolution is . . . . part of the larger story of the
increasing importance of individuals as actors under, and objects of, international law.”).
64. See Franck, supra note 40, at 343 (explaining that ICSID provides a private right of
action and a forum in which investors may act as private attorneys general).
65. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 31, at 2 (describing ICSID as “dormant” until
the early 1990s).
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implicating questions regarding sovereignty. The 122 pending and
68
176 concluded ICSID arbitrations amount to what some have called
69
a “litigation explosion.” ICSID arbitration and other dispute
resolution provisions within BITs are attractive to investors and their
home states because “[t]rust in the future conduct of [the] host state
70
and investor lies at the heart of every investment decision.”
Capital-exporting states and private investors maintain several
justifications for using ICSID to vindicate rights under BITs. First,
developed states wish to secure legal rights for their citizens
71
comparable to those found within sophisticated legal systems.
Second, states themselves have an interest in removing themselves
from investment disputes and leaving their resolution to
72
nongovernmental entities for political and financial reasons. Finally,
participation in the international investment regime may enhance
73
legal procedures and substance in developing states. Because parties
may appoint arbitrators who are knowledgeable in the area of
74
investment disputes but may not have a connection with either
75
party, ICSID arbitration may lessen some of the bias inherent in an
international dispute.
C. Potential Challenges to ICSID’s Legitimacy as a Justification for
Change
Despite the legitimacy-enhancing rules described in Part I.B and
ICSID’s arguable success in providing remedies for private investors,
ICSID may be improved in many respects. Common concerns involve

66. Franck, supra note 19, at 165.
67. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 3.
68. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, List of Concluded Cases,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=List
Concluded (last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
69. Franck, supra note 19, at 165.
70. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 31, at 6.
71. Ryan, supra note 28, at 742.
72. See id. (“[B]y creating a private right of action for investors, governments effectively
depoliticized investment disputes and transferred the responsibility and cost of enforcement to
investors.”).
73. See id. (“[D]eveloped countries hoped that the BIT regime would increase the global
respect for property rights and lead to an improvement in the domestic legal systems of
developing countries . . . .”); see also Borgen, supra note 63, at 688 (asserting that international
dispute resolution reinforces both substantive law and procedures for evaluating claims).
74. Sedlak, supra note 53, at 153.
75. Id. at 152.
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78

arbitrator accountability,
costs,
the tribunal’s legitimacy,
79
80
transparency, and award consistency. ICSID’s surge in usage has
81
simultaneously rendered it less popular among host states. Some
states are beginning once again to embrace the Calvo Doctrine,
emphasizing sovereignty over international cooperation, and have
either adopted or contemplated “measures to limit investment treaty
82
arbitrations and bring [investment disputes] under national control.”
These perceived weaknesses in ICSID arbitration and corresponding
responses illustrate the need for reform; it is possible that an
amendment to the ICSID Convention itself could temper some of
these concerns.
The strongest manifestation of a distaste for ICSID came in 2007,
83
when Bolivia withdrew from the ICSID Convention following
84
President Evo Morales’s nationalization of hydrocarbon assets.
Ecuador officially limited the scope of its participation in ICSID
when it filed a notification of certain classes of disputes for which it

76. See Odumosu, supra note 47, at 373 (arguing that ICSID faces a legitimacy crisis
because of its adoption of a “single economic rationale for investment protection” that does not
address alternative interests).
77. See Borgen, supra note 63, at 737 (describing participants in investor-state disputes as
an interconnected elite).
78. See Gottwald, supra note 49, at 239 (recognizing the expense developing countries must
make for a proper defense in investor-state disputes).
79. See id. at 256 (emphasizing the negative effects related to difficulties finding previous
ICSID awards).
80. Egli, supra note 62, at 1078–79 (expressing concern regarding inconsistencies in
investment arbitrations, which “often lack the finality and comparative uniformity of traditional
court rulings”).
81. These countries include Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, described infra
notes 83–91 and accompanying text.
82. Wenhua Shan, From “North-South Divide” to “Public-Private Debate”: Revival of the
Calvo Doctrine and the Changing Landscape in International Investment Law, 27 NW. J. INT’L L.
& BUS. 631, 635 (2007). Even the United States’ revised approach to investment treaties has
been described as an “apparent adoption of the Calvo Doctrine.” DUGAN ET AL., supra note 27,
at 488.
83. Press Release, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Bolivia
Submits a Notice Under Article 71 of the ICSID Convention (May 16, 2007),
http://icsid.worldbank.org (follow “More” hyperlink under “Announcements,” then follow
hyperlink to “Denunciation of ICSID Convention”) (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
84. Kevin T. Jacobs & Matthew G. Paulson, The Convergence of Renewed Nationalization,
Rising Commodities, and “Americanization” in International Arbitration and the Need for More
Rigorous Legal and Procedural Defenses, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 359, 382 (2008).
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85

rejected ICSID’s jurisdiction. The exception includes oil, gas, and
86
minerals.
Some states have expressed criticism with respect to ICSID.
87
Argentina, which faced dozens of ICSID claims in response to the
88
89
2001 financial crisis, has been critical of ICSID. In its legal
arguments before ICSID tribunals, Argentina has argued that its
monetary actions, which relied on non-precluded measures provisions
90
within its BITs, were necessary. Argentina has also advanced an
argument that BITs and investor-state dispute procedures run afoul
91
of its constitution.
Some developed states have even acted in a manner that
forecloses ICSID arbitration. The 2004 United States-Australia Free
92
Trade Agreement excluded an investor-state dispute provision,
although these provisions are routinely included in comparable
93
agreements concluded by other states. One explanation for this
omission suggests that the parties attempted to establish a shield from
94
liability. Should additional states reject participation, ICSID may

85. Press Release, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Ecuador’s
Notification Under Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention (Dec. 5, 2007),
http://icsid.worldbank.org (follow “More” hyperlink under “Announcements,” then follow
hyperlink to “Ecuador’s Notification under Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention”) (last
visited Aug. 19, 2009).
86. Jacobs & Paulson, supra note 84, at 383.
87. Odumosu, supra note 47, at 373.
88. For a discussion of investor-state arbitration in the context of sovereign debt, see
generally Karen Halverson Cross, Arbitration as a Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt Disputes,
17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 335 (2006); Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds
in International Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 711 (2007).
89. See Shan, supra note 82, at 643 (describing the Argentine government’s “attempt to
‘renationali[z]e’ state-investor disputes”). Venezuela and Nicaragua have also “questioned their
commitment to international investment law.” Ryan, supra note 28, at 726. Russia, Ukraine, the
Republic of Congo, Indonesia, and Pakistan have grown reluctant to enforce ICSID awards.
Emily A. Alexander, Note, Taking Account of Reality: Adopting Contextual Standards for
Developing Countries in International Investment Law, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 817, 829 (2008).
90. For a comprehensive analysis of non-precluded measures provisions in investor-state
disputes, see William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in
Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions
in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307 (2008).
91. Shan, supra note 82, at 638.
92. Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 190. This dispute resolution provision demonstrates that
states may find alternative solutions to investment law disputes.
93. E.g., U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 17, at § B.
94. See Franck, supra note 40, at 360–61 (“[T]wo nations with shared economic and
political goals, and substantial cross-border investment flows, recognize that they are both likely
to be on the receiving end of investor-State disputes. This means that both countries have an
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95

find its legitimacy compromised. To prevent further criticism by
ICSID members, the arbitral procedure should better reflect the
interests of developing states.
II. UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH A COMPREHENSIVE
MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY
Numerous proposals for a comprehensive multilateral
investment treaty have been made since World War II, but none have
96
garnered sufficient support. This Part addresses previous failed
attempts to reach a comprehensive, multilateral framework for
international investment. Part II.A looks at investment negotiations
in the context of international trade. Part II.B addresses the failures
of the 1990s negotiations for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI).
A common thread in the history of these multilateral investment
agreement talks has been the conflicting interests between developed
states—traditionally capital exporters—and developing states that
import capital. A multilateral agreement streamlining the
international investment system would likely only be plausible to the
extent that these competing interests may be reconciled. Introducing
an ICSID Convention provision modeled after the GATT General
Exceptions would provide an opportunity to address the interests of
capital importers in a forum preferred by capital exporters.
A. Investment in the World Trade Organization System
The international community first considered a multilateral
investment agreement as a possible third international structure to
complement the post–World War II Bretton Woods institutions in the
97
1940s. At the United States’ insistence, the 1948 Charter for an
International Trade Organization, or the Havana Charter, would
have provided protection for foreign investment from discriminatory
incentive to create a dispute resolution mechanism that creates barriers limiting the potential
number of claims.”). It is plausible that this decision had little to do with distrust for the
investor-state dispute system, but rather involved a comfort level based on the parties’ mutual
use of the Common Law. See id. at 360 (“[B]oth countries have well-developed rules of law and
a reliable and independent court systems [sic].”).
95. For further discussion on developed states that have reformed positions on
international investment law, see infra Part IV.A.
96. Amarasinha & Kokott, supra note 44, at 125–29.
97. Riyaz Dattu, A Journey from Havana to Paris: The Fifty-Year Quest for the Elusive
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 275, 287 (2000).
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treatment and expropriation. United States corporations, however,
felt the Havana Charter was too lenient toward developing countries,
whereas developing countries believed the proposed standards
99
granted investors too much power. The disagreement resulted in the
100
Havana Charter’s failure. From 1973 to 1979, the United States
again encouraged an investment agreement for the GATT Tokyo
101
Round agenda, but developing countries blocked the suggestion.
Limited measures relating to investment were adopted during
the Uruguay Round, which also implemented the World Trade
102
Organization (WTO). The General Agreement on Trade in Services
103
(GATS), designed “to remove barriers to cross-border trade in
104
services” applies wherever services are delivered through one of
105
four modes, including a “commercial presence,” which encompasses
investment. The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
106
(TRIMs Agreement) created a limited exception to GATT articles
for investment related to the trade of goods following an investor’s
107
entry into a host state. The narrow TRIMs measures allow
governments to mandate that investors incorporate domestically
108
produced inputs in manufacturing operations. These provisions did
not assume the role of BITs because they are not comprehensive
agreements on investment. Developed states walked away from the
Uruguay Round feeling dissatisfied with the investment measures and

98. Id.
99. Id. at 288.
100. Id.
101. Benjamin Martin, Comment, An Environmental Remedy to Paralyzed Negotiations for
a Multilateral Foreign Direct Investment Agreement, 1 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 232
(2007).
102. For a comprehensive discussion of the Uruguay Round negotiations and their results,
see generally WTO SECRETARIAT, GUIDE TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS (1999).
103. General Agreement on Trade in Services, supra note 10.
104. Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 176.
105. General Agreement on Trade in Services supra note 10, art. I.2. Professor Kenneth J.
Vandevelde has pointed out that under the GATS, “the WTO potentially has jurisdiction over
all foreign investment in the service sector of the economy.” Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 176.
106. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, supra note 11.
107. The TRIMs agreement has been criticized for taking a skeptical view of investment that
does not incentivize investment. See, e.g., Dattu, supra note 97, at 291 (addressing criticism that
calls TRIMs “attuned to the concerns of an era in policy-making characterized more by
suspicion of—and the need to control—foreign investment than by keenness to compete for and
attract such investment” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
108. WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 102, at 77.
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“defeated by the developing world in their quest to achieve a high
109
degree of investment liberalization within the WTO.”
In 2001, the Doha Ministerial Declaration again included plans
110
for multilateral investment negotiations. Developing states both
111
supported and criticized the possibility of revisiting investment. But
opposition from certain developing states, including India and
112
Malaysia, put an end to these investment talks. These states
opposed the negotiations for several reasons, including: lack of
preparation for additional rulemaking, a belief that investment policy
should remain in state hands and not be transferred to the WTO,
confidence in the protection that BITs afford investors, a view that
investment policy could not treat all states equally, and a desire to
113
develop domestic industries.
B. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment
Outside the WTO negotiating environment, the United States
encouraged negotiations for a comprehensive, multilateral investment
agreement within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
114
Development (OECD) in 1995. Supporters of the proposed MAI
hoped that a swift round of negotiations would be possible in light of
the OECD’s like-minded members, namely developed states with
“well-established, liberal, and transparent foreign investment
115
policies.” The MAI initially provided measures for increased
protection for investment, including national treatment,
116
nondiscrimination, and reduced barriers to investment. The initial
109. Dattu, supra note 97, at 295. Attempts to again revisit investment regulation in the
Doha Round were pushed aside. Martin, supra note 101, at 235.
110. See generally GALLAGHER, supra note 12, at 96–119 (describing the Doha Ministerial
Conference agenda and achievements).
111. Chile, Costa Rica, Korea, and Mexico supported investment negotiations. Weiss, supra
note 25, at 189.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Kurtz, supra note 42, at 757 (“The basis for the U.S. preference for the OECD
appears to be linked to the relatively modest results of the Uruguay Round TRIMS Agreement
which was often attributed to the recalcitrance of developing states.”).
115. Dattu, supra note 97, at 276; see also Kurtz, supra note 42, at 757 (describing the
intended MAI negotiations to be “an uncontroversial, somewhat technical exercise of building
upon existing norms”).
116. COMM. ON INT’L INV. & MULTINATIONAL ENTERS. & COMM. ON CAPITAL
MOVEMENTS AND INVISIBLE TRANSACTIONS, OECD, A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON
INVESTMENT,
DAFFE/CMIT/CIME(95)13/FINAL
(May
5,
1995),
available
at
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/htm/cmitcime95.htm.
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dispute settlement procedures would have allowed for both state-tostate and investor-state dispute systems, including ICSID
117
arbitration.
By removing negotiations from the WTO, MAI proponents
believed that developing states’ objections would be foreclosed from
118
119
negotiations. OECD members hoped to swiftly negotiate and sign
120
a multilateral treaty to which developing states would later accede.
Ultimately, the inability of even developed capital-exporting states to
121
agree on investment terms resulted in the MAI’s demise. France’s
withdrawal from the negotiations in October 1998 signaled the end of
122
the MAI talks. France grounded its withdrawal upon a Special
Commission’s determination that the MAI threatened national
123
sovereignty and also objected to the absence of a cultural exception
124
in the draft agreement. Within two months, MAI negotiations
125
within the OECD ceased.
Interestingly, the MAI negotiations incorporated many of the
arguments developing states traditionally advanced, despite the
OECD negotiation setting. When a MAI draft leaked out over the
Internet in 1997, nongovernmental organizations and civil society
expressed outrage against the exclusive nature of the negotiations,
which “created an air of hostility to the project that made it hard to
126
justify on a political level.” In response, later drafts of the MAI
incorporated provisions addressing sustainable development. These
revisions included recognition of sustainable development in the

117. Dattu, supra note 97, at 301.
118. M. SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 170 (2000).
119. The OECD originally envisioned MAI negotiations to conclude within two years.
Kurtz, supra note 42, at 758.
120. Dattu, supra note 97, at 298. Some developing states served as observers in the OECD
negotiations, including Argentina and Brazil. Id. at 295.
121. See id. at 298 (pointing to the amount of bracketed text in the draft MAI to
demonstrate how contentious the negotiations were even among OECD members).
122. DAVID HENDERSON, THE MAI AFFAIR: A STORY AND ITS LESSONS 31–32 (1999).
123. Peter T. Muchlinski, The Rise and Fall of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment:
Where Now?, 34 INT’L LAW. 1033, 1048–49 & n.83 (2000).
124. France and Canada, who “feared an ‘Americanisation’ of global media industries,”
supported a cultural exception that would allow discriminatory action in the interest of
preserving cultural heritage. Id. at 66. See generally Daisuke Beppu, Note, When Cultural Value
Justifies Protectionism: Interpreting the Language of the GATT to Find a Limited Cultural
Exception to the National Treatment Principle, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1765 (2008) (analyzing
cultural exceptions in the context of international trade).
125. Kurtz, supra note 42, at 761.
126. Muchlinski, supra note 123, at 1040.
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127

confirmation of state regulatory authority
treaty’s Preamble,
regarding health, safety, and environmental concerns consistent with
128
the MAI’s text, and a provision restricting activity that constitutes a
129
race to the bottom. A fourth suggestion would have appended to
the MAI OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises—a
document that expresses expectations for corporate behavior,
130
including employment standards and environmental concerns.
These issues are consistent with some of the concerns regarding
regulatory autonomy expressed by developing states in investment
131
treaty talks.
The MAI may have ultimately failed, but it clarified some of the
central questions that will arise in future multilateral investment
initiatives. The willingness of OECD negotiators to revise the draft
MAI to address civil society’s interests demonstrates that compromise
will not only be necessary, but also feasible, as the international
investment law community gradually agrees upon elements for a
comprehensive international investment regime. A series of
compromises should be reached before again attempting to advance
what one commentator describes as a “patchwork of international
132
rules on foreign investment.”
To reach a successful multilateral investment agreement, the
international investment system should implement incremental
changes that will help prospective participants in the system recognize
the advantages that such an agreement would provide. In 2000, one
commentator noted that “[m]any more bilateral and regional
agreements on investment have to be negotiated and concluded” to
133
make a multilateral agreement realistic. In addition to signing
134
additional investment treaties, the long-term nature of FDI means
that it may be premature to judge the effectiveness of recent treaties.
127. Rainer Geiger, Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 467, 472 (1998).
128. Id. at 472–73.
129. Id. at 473. The language of this exception was drawn from NAFTA principles. Kurtz,
supra note 42, at 772.
130. Geiger, supra note 127, at 473 (describing the OECD’s Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises as “an effective tool in promoting responsible conduct”).
131. E.V.K. FitzGerald, Developing Countries and Multilateral Investment Negotiations, in
MULTILATERAL REGULATION OF INVESTMENT 35, 48 (E.C. Nieuwenhuys & M.M.T.A. Brus
eds., 2001).
132. Kurtz, supra note 42, at 723.
133. Dattu, supra note 97, at 277.
134. E.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 31, at 3.
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Investment does not immediately spike following the conclusion of a
135
BIT, and certain types of disputes may be unlikely to arise in the
years immediately following an investment. Amending the ICSID
Convention in a manner that directly addresses the competing
interests that have stifled decades of multilateral investment
discussions would ultimately guide an attempt to ratify a
comprehensive multilateral investment agreement. Attempts to enact
a wholesale multilateral treaty on investment have failed, and a more
gradual approach appears suitable.
III. BORROWING FROM TRADE LAW’S GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
TO RECONCILE DIFFERENCES IN AN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME
The General Exceptions provisions in international trade
instruments set forth a series of exceptions that may logically be
carried over to the international investment area as a framework for
formally recognizing state regulatory autonomy in certain areas.
136
Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
establishes General Exceptions for legitimate, nondiscriminatory
137
regulation. The provision includes measures relating to public
138
139
140
morals; human, animal, or plant life or health; labor; cultural

135. E.g., Franck, supra note 40, at 339.
136. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 9. The GATT provisions sought
to reduce trade barriers and served as a de facto trade regime from their adoption in 1947 until
their incorporation into the World Trade Organization in 1994. Edith Brown Weiss & John H.
Jackson, The Framework for Environment and Trade Disputes, in RECONCILING
ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 1, 5 (Edith Brown Weiss, John H. Jackson & Nathalie BernasconiOsterwalder eds., 2d ed. 2008).
137. The GATT General Exceptions have a long history. The exceptions were first included
in the 1927 International Agreement for the Suppression of Import and Export Prohibitions and
Restrictions. Padideh Ala’i, Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of the WTO
Appellate Body’s Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade Liberalization, 14 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 1129, 1132 (1999). In 1947, the same exceptions became the basis for GATT Article XX.
Id. at 1133.
138. The Article XX(a) public morals exception has never been interpreted under the
GATT or the WTO systems, but conflicts between trade and public morals might relate to fur
trade, pornographic material, products manufactured by child labor, or animal cloning. AnneMarie de Brouwer, GATT Article XX’s Environmental Exceptions Explored: Is There Room for
National Policies? Balancing Rights and Obligations of WTO Members Under the WTO Regime,
in THE WTO AND CONCERNS REGARDING ANIMALS AND NATURE 9, 23 (Anton Vedder ed.,
2003). The provision’s uncertain legal meaning may be a reason for its nonuse, despite its
potential for use in environmental disputes. Id. For additional discussion of possible applications
of the public morals exception, see Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38
VA. J. INT’L L. 689, 736–43 (1998).
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142

value; and exhaustible natural resources. Within these areas,
states may act in a manner that amounts to discrimination provided
143
the measures are not “arbitrary or unjustifiable.” Similar provisions
are included in Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) and in Article III of the TRIMs agreement, which
144
both specifically address international investment. Through these
provisions, General Exceptions legitimizing state regulation for
sustainable development or social goals have the potential to cover
nearly all aspects of international trade. Investment law has the
capacity to formally provide for similar protections, even though
trade and investment bear unique attributes.
The WTO Appellate Body has gradually broadened its
interpretation of the General Exceptions provisions, making them
145
feasible safeguards for government action. Initially, these provisions
were interpreted narrowly. Two GATT decisions from the 1990s
concluded that United States regulations barring the importation of
tuna caught in a manner harmful to dolphins contravened trade
provisions under GATT, despite the environmental protection
146
provisions set forth in Article XX. In the first dispute, the GATT
panel expressed a belief that Article XX should be interpreted
147
narrowly, and that the word “necessary” in Article XX(b) ought not
148
to protect unpredictable environmental conditions.

139. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 9, art. XX(b).
140. Id. art. XX(e).
141. This exception relates to measures “imposed for the protection of national treasures of
artistic, historic, or archaeological value.” Id. art. XX(f).
142. Id. art. XX(g).
143. Id. art. XX.
144. Article 3 of the TRIMS agreement adopts all of GATT’s exceptions. Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures, supra note 11, art. 3. For further discussion of the GATS
and TRIMs agreements, see supra text accompanying notes 103–09. This Note generally refers
to GATT Article XX exceptions, but the reasoning provided would be equally applicable using
the GATS and TRIMS exceptions.
145. Ala’i, supra note 137, at 1132.
146. Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, ¶ 6.1, DS29/R (June 16,
1994) [hereinafter Dolphin-Tuna II]; Panel Report, United States—Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, ¶ 7.1(a), DS21/R–39S/155 (Sept. 3, 1991) [hereinafter Dolphin-Tuna I].
147. Dolphin-Tuna I, supra note 146, ¶ 5.22.
148. Id. ¶ 5.28 (noting that the U.S. limitation afforded the Mexican authorities inadequate
notice as to whether their policies conformed to U.S. standards at any given moment).
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In its 1998 decision in United States—Import Prohibition of
149
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Shrimp-Turtle), however, the
150
WTO Appellate Body recognized the right of WTO member states
151
to invoke Article XX exceptions provided the activities meet
152
requirements set forth in the provision. To reach this conclusion,
the WTO Appellate Body relied upon the Vienna Convention of the
153
Law of Treaties. The Appellate Body also set forth a two-step test
to determine Article XX’s applicability. First, a government action
154
must fall within the meaning of one of the exceptions. Second, the
155
measure must be consistent with Article XX’s chapeau. When the
Appellate Body applied this framework in Shrimp-Turtle, however, it
found that a U.S. regulation on shrimp imports did not take into
156
account differing conditions in other states, and it found that the
157
measure failed to satisfy the chapeau.
In 2001, a court used Article XX to allow public health
considerations to trump trade goals. In European Communities—
158
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, the
WTO Appellate Body validated France’s use of Article XX to allow a
159
ban on asbestos production, use, and trade. In recognizing the
health risks despite Canada’s commercial argument to uphold
149. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS56/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
150. Following the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the birth of the WTO, the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body and the WTO Appellate Body became the formal dispute resolution
institutions within the WTO. Weiss & Jackson, supra note 136, at 18–19.
151. United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, supra note
149, ¶ 156. The Appellate Body stated that WTO members “can and should” adopt measures to
protect endangered species and the environment. Id. ¶ 185.
152. Id. ¶ 157.
153. Id. at 61 n.152.
154. Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal
Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491, 494 (2002).
155. Id. Article XX’s chapeau, or preamble, reads
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 9, art. XX.
156. United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, supra note
149, ¶ 164.
157. Id. ¶ 187.
158. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
159. KELLY, supra note 152, at 102.
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traditional trade goals, “the Appellate Body demonstrated its desire
to uphold the panel’s precedent-setting support for non-trade
160
goals.”
This evolution of Article XX jurisprudence in the international
trade context demonstrates an increasing openness to environmental
and public health objectives in an area of law designed to promote
commercial interests. Although some commentators have criticized
161
the WTO’s ability to make use of Article XX in a genuine fashion,
exceptions based on this model could create an effective mechanism
for reconciling competing interests in the international investment
context.
The traditional separation of trade and investment law is an
apparent obstacle to importing GATT principles into ICSID.
International law treats trade and investment separately due to their
162
distinct economic roles.
Because trade involves exports and
investment attracts capital, legal frameworks designed to promote
163
these sectors to their fullest would involve inverse goals.
Considering trade and investment together, despite this
distinction, is reasonable because both subjects involve international
commerce. A single government office within a state often handles
164
trade and investment. At the individual level, certain business
operations may involve a combination of trade and investment
initiatives, and through legal argument, certain categories of trade
may be categorized as investment. The group of states that would
adhere to a comprehensive international investment treaty would
likely mirror participants in the World Trade Organization, and
160. Id. at 106.
161. E.g., Charles R. Fletcher, Greening World Trade: Reconciling GATT and Multilateral
Environmental Agreements Within the Existing World Trade Regime, 5 J. TRANSNAT’L L. &
POL’Y 341, 356 (1996).
162. The duration of transactions reinforces this distinction. See, e.g., DOLZER &
SCHREUER, supra note 31, at 3 (“Whereas a trade deal typically consists in a one-time exchange
of goods and money, the decision to invest in a foreign country initiates a long-term relationship
between the investor and the host country.”).
163. See Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination in Trade and Investment
Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 48, 53–54 (2008)
(“[T]rade and investment disciplines have traditionally focused on different, but
complementary, objectives: liberalization of trade flows, in the case of trade, and protection and
promotion of foreign investment, in the case of investment.”).
164. In the United States, the Office of the United States Trade Representative handles
matters of both trade and investment. For more information, see Office of the United States
Trade Representative, Mission of the USTR, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/mission (last visited
Aug. 19, 2009).
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investment rules would therefore be barred from undermining trade
agreements.
International trade and international investment law share many
of the same underlying values. Article XX’s implementation in
GATT required an evaluation of “the balance between the free trade
imperatives of . . . nondiscrimination rules and the various
165
exemptions for national policies.” This same evaluation is at the
heart of the disagreement in the international investment law context,
even though regional investment efforts such as NAFTA have not
166
included exceptions similar to Article XX. Additionally, a number
of international investment law analyses prescribe an international
167
investment framework within the WTO. Establishing a practice that
resembles GATT’s Article XX General Exceptions would streamline
future negotiations for a comprehensive, multilateral investment
regime as part of the WTO. For these reasons, borrowing principles
from international trade law is appropriate for the investment
168
regime.
IV. COMPROMISE THROUGH AN ICSID CONVENTION AMENDMENT
An alternative approach to WTO and OECD attempts to
reconcile competing interests in international investments may lie
within the ICSID framework. A primary ICSID goal “is to provide a
169
level playing field for investors and host countries.” At present,
170
however, developing host states facing ICSID claims often lack
sufficient resources to adequately represent themselves in
proceedings. Developing states must pay expensive legal fees to elite
171
Western law firms to obtain representation comparable in caliber to
that of private investors. When states cannot or do not wish to impose

165. Sol Picciotto, Linkages in International Investment Regulation: The Antinomies of the
Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 731, 737 (1998).
166. Kurtz, supra note 42, at 740.
167. E.g., Dattu, supra note 97, at 315–16.
168. But see Kurtz, supra note 42, at 741 (“GATT panels themselves have struggled with the
application of Article XX and its constituent parts, which has led to a variety of inconsistent
interpretations. These inconsistencies have in turn led to questions about the underlying
legitimacy of the GATT and the capacity of GATT panels to manage complex tradeoffs
between free trade and broader public values.”).
169. Sedlak, supra note 53, at 153.
170. Nearly two-thirds of filed investment treaty claims involve developing host states.
Gottwald, supra note 49, at 250.
171. Id. at 239.
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this burden on taxpayers, government attorneys without specialized
knowledge of the international investment regime are “left to
contend with scattered and incomplete legal authority resources with
172
no organized legal assistance from the international community.”
An ICSID provision that recognizes legitimate government
regulation relating to the environment and social rights could provide
leverage to states in investor-state disputes and further ICSID’s goal
of creating a level playing field.
The ICSID Convention may be amended in accordance with the
173
provisions set forth in Chapter IX. Ratification, acceptance, or
approval by all Contracting States is required for an amendment to
174
become effective. Amending the ICSID Convention, therefore, is
no easy feat. Some scholars have even suggested that the unanimous
ratification requirement largely rules out the possibility of ICSID
175
amendments. Other scholars believe that pending amendments
become effective among contracting states that agree to them before
176
they achieve universal ratification. Despite this controversy, a series
of ICSID amendments became effective in 2006, including measures
to make ICSID more transparent, increase third-party participation,
177
and provide a mechanism to dismiss frivolous claims.
The 2006 amendments demonstrate that the amendment
procedure can be used when necessary to reflect evolving norms
178
common among ICSID Convention signatories. An amendment

172. Id. at 240.
173. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States, supra note 46, ch. 9.
174. Id. art. 66(1). Any state party may propose an amendment to the Administrative
Council. If a proposal is approved by a majority vote by the Administrative Council, the
proposed amendment will be circulated to all parties to the ICSID Convention. Id. For a brief
overview of ICSID amendment procedures, see Reisman, supra note 48, at 806.
175. See, e.g., CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 1267
(2001) (adopting this position).
176. Reisman, supra note 48, at 806 (“It appears that prior to universal acceptance, the
amendment would be effective between contracting states that accepted it, but not between an
accepting state and a state that had not yet accepted it.”). But see SCHREUER, supra note 175, at
1267 n.2 (“Art. 40 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties foresees the application of
an agreement amending a treaty only among States that are parties to the amending agreement.
But this rule only applies unless the treaty in question otherwise provides.”).
177. J. Anthony VanDuzer, Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State
Arbitration Through Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation, 52 MCGILL L.J. 681, 687
(2007).
178. But see Sedlak, supra note 53, at 157 (calling the ICSID Convention amendment
process “unwieldy to the point of being impractical”).
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recognizing the consideration of environmental, public health, and
labor standards could reasonably be accepted by all contracting
states. First, the provision would signal to signatories that ICSID is
willing to look more favorably upon a state’s ability to regulate.
Second, to the extent that ICSID signatories recognize the
importance of taking a step toward reconciling ongoing differences in
179
comprehensive multilateral investment treaty negotiations, the
potential long-term benefits of this provision should become
apparent. Because the provision would address developing states’
interests in a manner that even developed states favoring investment
180
liberalization have begun to advocate, the provision is an ideal point
of departure for multilateral investment talks.
Incremental modifications to the international investment
regime through the ICSID Convention are appropriate in light of two
key changes in the assumptions that underlie the international
investment regime. This Part will explore these key changes. First,
many suppliers of foreign investment come from developing
181
countries, and developed states are increasingly capital importers.
Second, the ideological basis for strong investment protection
underlying ICSID’s original mandate, which emphasized protection
182
from widespread nationalization during the Cold War, is outdated.
Addressing these concerns through an amendment to the ICSID
Convention would better reflect contemporary concerns in
international investment and enhance ICSID’s legitimacy.
A. Shifting the Paradigm: Capital Exporters Become Capital
Importers
The traditional international investment paradigm involves a
developed state, typically the United States, Japan, or a Western
183
European country, exporting capital to a developing state. In these
situations, the capital exporter demands investment protection in the
form of substantive rights, such as assurances for nondiscrimination

179. See Dattu, supra note 97, at 298–302 (identifying areas of disagreement in the MAI
negotiations).
180. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 17, art. 12 (recognizing expanded state regulatory
autonomy in matters concerning environmental protection).
181. Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 182.
182. Id. at 167–70.
183. Kurtz, supra note 42, at 716 (observing that, as of 2000, most foreign direct investment
came from a “Triad” consisting of the European Union, the United States, and Japan).
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and against expropriation, as well as procedural rights through
dispute resolution provisions.
This paradigm has shifted since the turn of the twenty-first
century. States that have traditionally been considered developing
countries have increasingly become sources of foreign investment,
184
rather than recipients.
Developed states have simultaneously
185
Moreover, developing states have
become capital importers.
186
entered into BITs with one another, perhaps indicating that some
187
businesses based in developing states are becoming major investors.
South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia initially led the way in
supplying capital to traditional capital importers; they were later
188
joined by Chile, Mexico, and South Africa. India, China, and Brazil
189
A surge in claims,
are also increasingly capital exporters.
particularly those arising from NAFTA, against developed states
through ICSID and other international arbitral procedures has led
190
traditional advocates for strong investment protection to revisit
191
their investment policy goals.
The United States Model BIT, as revised in 2004, further
corroborates this shifting paradigm and adds two articles to protect
and expand the regulatory mandate of host states. Article 12 guides
the interpretation of BITs so that states may adopt, maintain, or
enforce certain measures “in a manner sensitive to environmental
192
concerns.” Article 13 states that “it is inappropriate to encourage

184. See Elkins et al., supra note 5, at 273 (observing that since 1999, the number of
developing countries entering into bilateral investment treaties has exploded).
185. Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 182 (adding that “foreign direct investment in the United
States grew from $83 billion in 1980 to $1.5 trillion in 2003”).
186. Shan, supra note 82, at 661 (“The changing role of developing states is also witnessed
by a notable increase of South-South BITs in recent years . . . . [T]he largest number of new
BITs signed during 2004 were between developing states.”).
187. Gottwald, supra note 49, at 243.
188. Shan, supra note 82, at 661; see also Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 182 (“In 2003,
Singapore’s stock of direct investment abroad was larger than that of several developed
countries, including Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Norway, and Portugal.”).
189. See Shan, supra note 82, at 661 (observing that India, China, and Brazil are “at the
taking-off stage”).
190. The United States initiated investment liberalization reforms in connection with GATT
and also recommended the OECD’s attempt to negotiate a multilateral agreement. See supra
Part II.
191. See, e.g., Shan, supra note 82, at 650 (pointing out that in the wake of NAFTA
tribunals, the United States has gradually weakened its commitment to investment protection).
192. 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 17, art. 12.
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investment by weakening or reducing the protections afforded in
193
domestic labor laws.”
The model treaty’s rules on expropriation elaborate similar
194
standards. These rules helped produce Annex B to the 2004 United
States Model BIT. Annex B’s provisions include a statement that
“[e]xcept in rare circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions
by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment,
195
do not constitute indirect expropriations.” Previously, no such
196
exceptions existed, and the United States refused to enter into a
197
BIT that did not announce strict rules regarding expropriation. The
United States adopted this view as capital inflows became more
198
significant, and it found itself defending claims for expropriation.
Investors opposed the changes, calling them a “substantial weakening
of investor protections . . . [not] justified by any reasonable
assessment of risk to the United States as a defendant against
199
potential claims.”
NAFTA’s investment provisions, to which the United States and
Canada are subject, have been particularly relevant to this transition.
During NAFTA negotiations, Canada largely turned away from
200
considerations relating to sovereignty. It was not until Canada
became subject to investor-state disputes that it urged that Chapter 11

193. Id. art. 13.
194. Article 6 of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT states that
[n]either Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or
indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization
(‘expropriation’), except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) in a non-discriminatory
manner; (c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; and (d) in
accordance with due process of law.
Id. art. 6. For further discussion of expropriation in international investment law, see infra Part
IV.B.
195. 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 17, at Annex B.
196. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Republic of Honduras Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Hond., July 1, 1995, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-27 (2000).
197. Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 171.
198. See Ryan, supra note 28, at 756 (“[I]n response to its new-found role as a respondent,
the United States created a new model BIT that contains far more detailed provisions on certain
procedural matters and certain substantive protections accorded to investors.”).
199. Proposed New U.S. “Model” Bilateral Investment Treaty, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 836, 837
(2004) (quoting SUBCOMM. ON INV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ADVISORY COMM. ON INT’L
ECON. POL., REPORT REGARDING THE DRAFT MODEL BILATERAL INV. TREATY 2–3 (Jan. 30,
2004)).
200. Tollefson, supra note 30, at 146.
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be revisited to allow nondiscriminatory regulations relating to public
201
202
health and the environment. Canada also updated its model BIT.
These model BIT changes reflect a willingness on the part of
some of the strongest advocates of investment protection, at least
historically, to step back from traditionally one-sided BITs. Because
an amendment for social and labor conditions would embody many of
the principles that the United States has sought to enforce in the
international investment regime since 2003, the United States would
likely ratify the amendment, and, in turn, influence similarly situated
203
developed states to do the same.
B. Expropriation and the Outdated Ideological Assumptions
Underlying International Investment Law
Expropriation has long provoked a vigorous debate in
204
international investment law. It has been described as the area in
which “one sees most clearly the inevitable conflict between
sovereignty and stability, between the State’s need to control its
economy and the foreign investor’s need to anticipate the costs of
205
that control.” Expropriation is central to the formation of any
negotiation treaty because it directly affects the rights and
206
expectations of investors. In addition to its recognition in customary
207
international law, expropriation has long been recognized by the
208
United States. Under the Hull Formula, announced by thenSecretary of State Cordell Hull in 1938, expropriation requires
201. Id.
202. But see Shan, supra note 82, at 656 (pointing out that revised BITs “do not alter the
fundamental character of these investment treaties as quintessential liberalist instruments,
which only protect and ‘empower’ investors without sufficient consideration of the rights of host
states and the duties of the investors”).
203. Several countries have followed the United States in reforming its approach to BITs,
including Canada, Japan, and certain Latin American states. Id. at 652.
204. For background on expropriation in international investment law, see generally
DUGAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 429–89; August Reinisch, Expropriation, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, supra note 15, at 407, 407–58.
205. Jack Coe, Jr. & Noah Rubins, Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case: Context
and Contributions, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING
CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW 597, 666–67 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005).
206. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 31, at 89 (“Expropriation is the most severe
form of interference with property. All expectations of the investor are destroyed in case the
investment is taken without adequate compensation.”).
207. Muchlinski, supra note 123, at 1035–36.
208. DUGAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 483.
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“prompt, adequate, and effective” compensation. This principle
became “the presumptive standard for modern expropriation
210
compensation.” During the twentieth century, the United States
went so far as to refuse to sign any investment treaty that did not
211
incorporate the Hull Formula. Expropriation remains among the
212
most common allegations in ICSID jurisprudence.
An initial motivation for developed states to both enter into
BITs and consent to ICSID arbitration involved providing protection
for investors against expropriation, especially in light of
nationalizations following decolonization and throughout the Cold
213
War. Decolonization motivated foreign investment participants to
consider treaties because “newly independent states were fiercely
214
protective of their independence.” These states also feared that
foreign investment would allow former colonizers to reassert
215
control. Socialist states that expropriated private industry equally
affected foreign investment, and in 1974, developing and socialist
countries provoked the United Nations General Assembly “to
establish recognition of their right to expropriate foreign
216
investment.” A fear of expropriation without compensation drove
217
developed countries to enter into the earliest BITs.
Assumptions grounded in outdated ideologies of the postcolonial period and Cold War are no longer rational bases for
investment laws. These obsolete assumptions remain the basis of the
international investment system in the form of BITs. Although these
BITs may reap greater profits and larger damages in disputes for

209. David L. Gunton, Note, Liability Begins at Home: An Alternative Compensation
Scheme for NAFTA Expropriations, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 225 (2007).
210. Id. at 226.
211. Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 171.
212. See, e.g., Técnicas Medioambientales S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2,
May 29, 2003, 19 ICSID (W. Bank) 158, ¶¶ 114–16 (2004) (evaluating formalities of
expropriation); Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Aug. 30, 2000, 5
ICSID (W. Bank) 209, ¶¶ 102–04 (2002) (finding indirect expropriation under NAFTA Chapter
11 after Mexico declared conservation measures).
213. See, e.g., DUGAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 436 (discussing petroleum concession
seizures).
214. Vandevelde, supra note 37, at 166.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 167.
217. Id. at 168.
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corporations, they do so at the expense of host state taxpayers and
sustainable development. Whereas it is rational for private investors
219
to seek higher financial incentives, particularly in the short term,
private investors can benefit in the long-term if host states are
permitted to regulate in matters relating to the environment and
public health. If the labor force within a host state becomes healthier,
220
investors may be able to reap greater productivity in the long run.
Certain perverse incentives within the international investment
system have grown apparent, even to the strongest supporters of
221
international investment treaties and investor-state disputes. In
addition to a race to the bottom among developing states to
incentivize foreign investment, the possibility of liability under the
present international investment system may discourage states from
enacting legitimate regulations.
As these perverse incentives within the international investment
system have become apparent, even to developed states, changes
proposed by developing states in comprehensive, multilateral
222
investment agreement negotiations appear increasingly appropriate.
Although the traditional motivations for the international investment
system bolster a private investor’s profits, the failure to incorporate
evolving attitudes of the international community into the legal
framework could strip ICSID of its adherents and render private
investors’ international legal framework less potent.
Arbitral awards have also shifted toward this line of reasoning,
particularly with respect to the matter of expropriation. In Feldman v.
223
Mexico, the tribunal’s reasoning reflected this transition, stating
that, “In the past, confiscatory taxation, denial of access to
infrastructure or necessary raw materials, imposition of unreasonable
regulatory regimes, among others, have been considered to be
expropriatory actions. . . . Reasonable governmental regulation of this

218. See T. Leigh Anenson, Defining State Responsibility Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven:
Measures “Relating to” Foreign Investors, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 675, 677 (2005) (“If the corporation
wins, the taxpayers of the ‘losing’ NAFTA nation must pay the bill.”).
219. See Fry, supra note 60, at 112 (“It certainly is not a crime for investors to want the best
deal possible.”).
220. Id. at 112–13.
221. See supra notes 190–203 and accompanying text.
222. See supra Part II.
223. Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Dec. 16, 2002, 18 ICSID (W.
Bank) 488 (2003).
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type cannot be achieved if any business that is adversely affected may
224
seek compensation . . . .”
225
Another tribunal, in LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina,
adopted a balancing test to determine the legitimacy of state
226
regulation.
The test balances “the degree of the measure’s
interference with the right of ownership and the power of the State to
227
adopt its policies.” In announcing the test, the tribunal followed
228
and
Técnicas Medioambientales S.A. v. Mexico (Tecmed)
considered the proportionality of a state’s actions compared to its
229
effect on the public interest.
These cases stand in sharp contrast to an ICSID award rendered
only a few years earlier, which prioritized investor claims at the
expense of state interests. In 2000, an ICSID tribunal explained that,
“[e]xpropriatory environmental measures—no matter how laudable
and beneficial to society as a whole—are, in this respect, similar to
any other expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to
implement its policies: where property is expropriated . . . the state’s
230
obligation to pay compensation remains.” This strong language
appears to encourage investors to bring claims, even minor ones,
when states enact regulations that could result in even the slightest
harm.
In their more recent cases, however, ICSID panels have shifted
toward firmer protection of state regulatory interests. A provision
modeled after Article XX of GATT, therefore, would not be
231
inconsistent with recent ICSID jurisprudence. In fact, the provision
would not necessarily alter ICSID awards, particularly in light of the
224. Id. ¶ 103. The arbitral award in Methanex v. United States, Aug. 3, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1345
(2005), is widely recognized for deciding that a California ban on gasoline additives was a
legitimate regulation after a Canadian company filed a NAFTA claim. Id. ¶ 102.
225. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Oct. 3, 2006, 46 I.L.M.
36 (2007) (decision on liability).
226. Id. ¶ 189.
227. Id.
228. Técnicas Medioambientales, TECMED S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/00/2, May 29, 2003, 19 ICSID (W. Bank) 158 (2004).
229. LG&E Energy Corp., 46 I.L.M. 36, ¶ 195.
230. Santa Elena v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Feb. 17, 2000, 5 ICSID (W.
Bank) 153, 192.
231. See Reinisch, supra note 204, at 437 (describing instances in which investment dispute
panels found state regulatory activity permissible). ICSID awards do not represent binding
authority for future claims, but they do provide persuasive support and tribunals do draw upon
previous awards. Gottwald, supra note 49, at 256. ICSID has, however, been criticized for
inconsistent decisions. Id. at 259–60.
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cases discussed above. Even without an Article XX–type provision,
arbitral panels interpreting regulations and following revised BITs
could reasonably arrive at the same result without a formal
amendment. Although the legal system has the potential to arrive at
this result organically, developing countries and critics of the investorstate dispute system may be unaware of informal shifts in the
jurisprudence of ICSID that might benefit them. After all, the ICSID
tribunals’ validations of regulatory activity discussed above occurred
before Bolivia and Ecuador repudiated the ICSID Convention in full
232
or in part.
Incorporating an exception for state regulation relating to
environmental, public health, and labor standards into the ICSID
Convention would provide a means by which state interests might be
better balanced against those of private investors. Such a provision
might also deter private investors from bringing frivolous claims
before ICSID. It has already been noted that trade disputes are
233
increasingly framed as investment disputes for the attractive,
234
enforceable damages that have been awarded through the investor235
state dispute process.
In sum, the provision advanced in this Note would reduce the
effect of anachronistic assumptions that persist in investor-state
arbitration and underlying treaties. The ICSID Convention would
better reflect contemporary standards and expectations, enhancing
ICSID’s popularity among developed and developing countries alike.
CONCLUSION
Developed and developing states may not have interests that are
at odds with one another to the extent that some commentators
perceive. By taking a relatively small step toward a formal
compromise, using an amendment to the ICSID Convention,
developed and developing states may be able to sit down at the
negotiating table in the future to identify an effective framework for
international investment law. This approach would provide an
alternative method for reaching an agreement in an area in which
negotiations appear perpetually blocked.
232. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
233. Anenson, supra note 218, at 732.
234. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
235. Unlike investor-state disputes, trade cases before the WTO are subject to specific
performance remedies. DiMascio & Pauwelyn, supra note 163, at 48.
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Amending the ICSID Convention to allow ICSID tribunals to
consider environmental and social concerns in their evaluation of
investor-state disputes would recognize interests that are traditionally
underrecognized in this area of law. This addition would be consistent
with evolving standards in the area of international investment law
and would enhance ICSID’s legitimacy. Acknowledging this trend is
key as investors bring an increasing number of claims before ICSID
and as some member states grow dissatisfied with ICSID rules.
The innovation of ICSID tribunals—namely, granting a right of
action for investors—provides an alternative remedy for private
parties. This innovation represents an increasingly sophisticated
international legal system that addresses global economic challenges.
Acting in a manner that is overly sympathetic to investor interests in
the short term could easily translate into long-term harm if states,
particularly developed ones, become disinterested in ICSID
participation. Creating an exception modeled after the GATT Article
XX General Exceptions would address developed and developing
states’ concerns and ensure ICSID’s continued success as an
institution that provides solutions for complex legal questions
associated with global commerce. Simultaneously, this exception may
advance the multilateral investment agreement project beyond the
recurring disagreements that have barred its culmination and
ultimately pave the way toward a workable, comprehensive global
investment treaty.

